Abstract-Probable security is an important criteria for analyzing the security of cryptographic protocols. However, writing and verifying proofs by hand are prone to errors. This paper introduces the game-based approach of writing security proofs and its automatic technique. It advocates the automatic security proof approach based on process calculus, and presents the initial game and observational equivalences of OAEP+.
INTRODUCTION
Information security is nowadays an important issue. Its essential ingredient is cryptography. To be accepted, a cryptographic scheme must come with a proof that it satisfies some standard security properties. However, a problem we have to face is that as a community, we generate more proofs than we carefully verify, and as a consequence some of our published proofs are incorrect. In fact, many of our proofs are truly complex, error-prone and difficult to check.
In 2004, Shop [1] discussed techniques for structuring security proofs as sequences games. Game-playing is an approach to write security proofs that are easy to verify. In this approach, security definitions and intractable problems are written as programs called games, and reduction security proofs are sequences of game transformations [1] [2] [3] . Barthe, Cerderquist, and Tarento [4, 5] have formalized the generic model and the random oracle model in the interactive theorem prover Coq [6] , and proved signature schemes in this framework. Later, Nowak [7] and Affeldt et.al. [8] show how to formalize the game-playing framework in the proof assistant Coq. However, proofs in generic interactive theorem provers require a lot of human effort, in order to build a detailed enough proof for the theorem prover to check it.
Halevi [9] explains that implementing an automatic tool based on compiler techniques to build security proofs with sequences of games, and suggests ideas in this direction, but does not actually implement one. In 2006, B. Blanchet and D. Pointcheval [10] presented a pioneer implementation of gameplaying that has been applied to several standard cryptographic schemes taken from the literature [11, 12] . Further works can be found in [13, 14] . However, this is still a new research area, and until now there are only a few number of cryptographic schemes can be proved with their automatic tool.
This paper introduces the game-based approach of writing security proofs and its automatic technique. It advocates the automatic security proof approach based on process calculus, and presents the initial game and observational equivalences of OAEP+ [15] . The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we explain the gamebased approach of writing security proofs. In Sect. 3, we introduce an implementation with process calculus. In Sect. 4, we present the initial game and observational equivalences of OAEP+. Finally, we conclude in Sect. 5.
II. PROVABLE SECURITY AND GAMED BASED PROOFS
Security for cryptograptic primitives is typically defined as an attack game involves a stateful adversary that interacts with some interfaces of whatever scheme that we are dealing with. We usually call these interfaces the challenger. Both adversary and challenger are probabilstic processes that communicate with each other, and so we can model the game as a probability space. Typically, the definition of security is tied to some particular event S. Security means that for every "efficient" adversary, the probability that event S occurs is "very close to" some specified "target probabilty": typically, either 0 or 1/2.
A canonical game consists of a main loop, where each iteration calls an adversary routine, supplying it with the results of the last iteration and getting back the query to be asked in the current iteration. Then the appropriate interface it invoked for the current query, and the result is again fed to the adversary routine in the next iteration. The game is parametrized by some upper bound on the number of iterations (and maybe also upper bounds on other resources of the adversary). It is usually convenient to assume that the adversary fully consumes its resources, and in particular that the number of iterations of the main loop is always exactly equal to the upper bound. Once the main loop is finished, the game may have some output, and this output is typically just the last thing that the adversary has output (more often than not a single bit).
To make it clearer, we show an example of the game for indistinguishability against adaptive chosen cipher-text attack (IND-CCA2) of public key encryption.
IND-CCA2 Game: 
is negligible, then the scheme is secure. Now, to prove security using the sequence-of-games approach, one prodceeds as follows. One constructs a sequence of games, Game 0, Game 1, . . . , Game n, where Game 0 is the original attack game with respect to a given adversary and cryptographic primitive. Let 0 S be the event S , and for n i ,..., 0 = , the construction defines an event i S in Game i, usually in a way naturally related to the definition of S. The proof shows that ]
, and that ] Pr[ n S is equal (or negligibly close) to the "target probability." From this, it follows that Pr[S] is negligibly close to the "target probability," and security is proved.
III. AN IMPLEMENTATION WITH PROCESS CALCULUS
Attack game is a system that involves probabilstic processes communicate with each other. Process calculus [16] can represent the parallel or serial interacts of the adversary and the challenger, and the probabilistic semantics provide a description of the probabilistic reduction of the sequence of games.
A. Process Calculus
Blanchet [10, 17] provides a process calculus to represent games. The calculus is inspired by the pi-calculus. It introduces arrays for accessing to the whole memory state of the system and replacing lists often used in proofs. The syntax is as following.
Term
:: respectively.
Output process 
B. Game Transitions
There are two main kinds of game transformations that allow us to get the sequence of games: syntactic transformations and transformations from the definitions of security of primitives.
Syntactic transformations transform games with syntactic properties. For examples, when x is defined by an assignment
, we can replace x with its value M. Simplify is the most important syntactic transformation, which combines some equations and probabilistic properties to simplify terms and processes.
The security of cryptographic primitives is defined using observational equivalences given as axioms. We denote by ] Pr[ a Q → the probability that the process Q return with a, and denote by ] Pr[ ℜ → Q the probability that the process Q executes exactly the sequence of events ℜ , in the order of ℜ .
Definition 1 (Observational equivalence). We say that Q and Q' are observationally equivalent up to probability p, written ' Q Q p ≈ , when for all t, for all contexts C acceptable for Q and Q' that run in time at most t, for all bit-strings a,
Proposition 1 [16] . T is the domain of Hash function and 2 T is its value type.
C. Criteria for Provable Security
After each successful transformation, we should test whether the desired security properties are proved. So we need some criteria for provable security. As to public key encryption, we need to test the secrecy of the bit value b in IND-CCA2 game.
Definition 2 (one-session secrecy). The process Q preserves the one-session secrecy of x when Intuitively, the adversary cannot distinguish a process that outputs the value of the secret x from one that outputs a random number y. For IND-CCA2 game, we need to prove that the bit value b satisfies the one-session secrecy.
Proposition 2 [16] . If Q and Q' are observationally equivalent, and Q preserves the one-session secrecy of x, then Q' preserves the one-session secrecy of x.
IV. INITIAL GAME AND OBSERVATIONAL EQUIVALENCES OF OAEP+
A. The Description of OAEP+ [15] Let k be the security parameter, f the trapdoor one-way permutations. g is the inverse of f. 
And
are hash functions. OAEP+ is described as follows.
KGen: For a seed r , output public key ) (r pkgen pk = and secret key ) (r skgen sk = .
Enc: For input a message m, pick a random 
respectively, 5 T the key seed type, then 2 1 : to express the process that inputs ) : ,..., : (
, and outputs the result of FP .
1) One-Way Permutations:
The trapdoor one-way permutation f is the kernel component for OAEP＋. We define the success probability of an adversary A to invert.
We denote by ) (t Succ OW the maximal success probability an adversary can get within time t. Eventually, the following observationally equivalent processes for one-way permutation can be used in the transformations: 
t and pkgen t are times for (.) f and (.) pkgen respectively. In the right hand of the observationally equivalence, if x has been outputted, then k is defined and hence the adversary can determine whether
holds, otherwise, the adversary always output false for
. There are some other algebra properties for trapdoor oneway permutations that can be used for security proof. For example (  (  ,  : , : 2 1 , and so on. We do not discuss the details further.
2) Hash Functions
In the random oracle, we assume that hash functions are random oracles. That is, for an input, if it has been in the access list, then the process returns with the result in the list, otherwise, it picks a random value as the respond. The observation equivalence for G(.), H'(.) and H(.) are as following. : , :
. According to the definition of IND-CCA2 in section 2.2, first, the system runs the key generation process processKGen, follows with the processes processDec and processT. In the following attacks, the adversary can access the decryption process at most D q times, and at some time, the adversary can access the challenge cipher-text generation process. Hence, the processDec is parallelized with processT. In the random oracle, the attack can access the random oracle at any time. Up to now, we have described the Initial Game and Observational Equivalences of OAEP+. Next, we explain how we organize the transformations in order to prove the security. At the beginning of the proof, and after each successful cryptographic transformation, we should execute syntactic transformations, and test whether the desired one-session secrecy are proved. If so, we have proved. Otherwise, we try to execute each available cryptographic transformation in turn. When such a cryptographic transformation fails, it returns some syntactic transformations that could make the desired transformation work. Then we try to perform these syntactic transformations. When the syntactic transformations finally succeed, we retry the desired cryptographic transformation, and so on.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper introduces the game-based approach of writing security proofs and its automatic technique. It advocates the automatic security proof approach based on process calculus, and presents the initial game and observational equivalences of OAEP+. Up to now, this is still a new research area, only a small number of cryptography protocols can be disposed with this approach, and we should make further researches on the transformation rules and strategies.
